Abstract
One of the concerns that animated the search for a new constitution in Kenya was how to build more effective mechanisms for accountability. Towards this end, the 2010 Constitution of Kenya establishes constitutional commissions and independent offices in an attempt to dismantle and democratize the Kenyan state. This paper proceeds on the basis that what determines whether an independent institution ends up as an effective force for accountability in governance is its institutional design. The paper thus interrogates the constitutional and statutory design of the regime meant to effectuate the independence, accountability, and effectiveness of these independent institutions to determine whether they can deliver on their mandate.
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