Abstract

AbstractAs a member of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, I was involved in early deliberations about the appropriateness of publishing this avian influenza research when manuscripts were referred to us from two scientific journals during their review process, via the U.S. government. As described by David Resnik in this issue, we grappled with benefits and risks, and in our initial, unanimous decision recommended limited publication, alerting the world to the possibility of evolved transmissibility in these viruses but with redaction of the exact genetic mutations that would enable anyone skilled in the art to synthesize these potentially dangerous viruses. However, after additional discussion, both internal and external to the board, we were asked to reconsider the situation, and this time a majority voted in favor of full publication. I was one of the minority that opposed full publication.Resnik points to the difficulties of performing a formal risk‐benefit assessment without the means of quantifying these two terms and suggests application of reasoning based on the precautionary principle instead. This makes sense. But there are three other issues that should be highlighted.

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