The Incidence of Executive Vetoes in Comparative Perspective: The Case of American State Governments, 1979-1999

Abstract

The paper examines the determinants of executive vetoes in a comparative environment (49 state governments) providing finer-grained evidence than extant studies about how and why vetoes happen. Results show that divided government and approaching elections have a positive effect on vetoes, even when controlling for the features of the veto, professionalization, and the economy. Additionally, parties with enough seats to override vetoes are systematically associated with greater veto incidence. This effect had been overlooked because veto-proof majorities, common in states and other countries, are rare at the national level. In divided state governments, between 6 and 10 additional vetoes per session are attributable to approaching elections, between 4 and 7 to veto-proof majorities. I discuss implications for our understanding of the causal mechanism of the veto.