Abstract
Donald Davidson’s theory of mind, “anomalous monism”, has been extremely influential in the philosophy of mind during the two and a half decades since Davidson devised it. In particular, it has attracted a number of followers among a group I will call “naturalistic mentalists” — philosophers who are strongly realist about mental phenomena, but who seek to explain the facts about human mental life within a materialist framework and to locate mental phenomena within the natural, causal order. The main reason for such enthusiasm as is found within this camp is that Davidson’s theory has appeared to many of these philosophers to offer relief from one of the most vexing puzzles bedeviling naturalistic theorizing about the mind.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
