The (In)efficiency and (Un)certainty of Non-propositional Structures of Reality … or, Adventures in Philosophy of Understanding

Abstract

This article critically discusses understanding, certainty and efficiency in relation to juridical and jurisprudential contexts. Understanding is an undertheorized topic in law and jurisprudence, despite philosophy and epistemology addressing it at some length in recent years. The focus, therefore, is on understanding-in-law (or understanding as a cognitive function of the law) rather than understanding-of-law, which is an exceedingly well-trodden path in doctrinal, critical and philosophical legal work. The article acknowledges that this branch of epistemology is perhaps new ground for legal academics, and thanks to Luca Siliquini-Cinelli’s landmark book, Scientia Iuris, the article is a response to his thesis that law’s regulatory function has grown in recent decades to embrace and embody knowledge while voiding experience. And while this leads Siliquini-Cinelli to the conclusion that law is a matter only of knowledge, not of experience, the article raises questions about what dwells cognitively between poles of knowledge and experience, and how we can take from or define a place for understanding between poles of knowledge and experience. It also explores the role of certainty and efficiency in shaping understanding in law and beyond, with understanding ultimately defined as a grasping of the structures of the objects of law, different from and in contrast to legal knowledge. Keywords: understanding; certainty; knowledge; efficiency; law.