The Importance of Hegelian Recognition

Abstract

In the previous chapter I presented a critical overview of three contemporary theories of recognition. Despite the significant differences between each account, Taylor, Honneth and Fraser all agree that recognition has a fundamental and irreplaceable role to play in establishing a just society. The question to be explored now in more depth is why recognition is seen as so important. Why, to quote Taylor (1994: 26), is it a ‘vital human need’? In order to understand the value placed on recognition by many contemporary theorists, it is necessary to take a historical over-view of how the subject has been conceptualised by Western philosophers. This will reveal how the idea of recognition has become a central explanatory tool for understanding the formation of the subject, and thus why it is something which we, as subjects, cannot live without. I also address how recognition shapes the self—other relationship — that is, how our understanding of one another is underpinned by relations of recognition — and the implications that recognition has for how we understand freedom and autonomy.