The importance of being autonomous: Understanding the Blair Government’s policy towards the single currency

Abstract

This article gives analytical priority to the state and explores the utility of such an approach when it comes to understanding British policy towards the Euro. It combines the work of the British political scientist, Jim Bulpitt, with that of the US scholar, Eric Nordlinger, and asserts that this union can help reveal a neglected aspect of the ‘story’ behind this non-decision. The Blair Government rejected single currency membership because it perceived eurozone structures to be a threat to its governing autonomy. This administrative discretion was important in its own right, as well as a means for delivering other policies thought crucial to the party’s electoral success. This argument is not incompatible with other explanations that stress the role of the Eurosceptical media or public opinion. But it does assert that the motives and behaviour of Blair, Brown and their close colleagues were not decisively constrained by these pressures.