Abstract

The period since the death of Stalin has been characterized by rather marked changes of Soviet policy both internally and externally. The assumption of this paper is that these policy changes are largely dictated by the situation in which the members of the top elite contending for power find themselves, and are necessary expedients without which they might have found themselves involved in more problems than they could handle. The main elements of Soviet external commitments at the time of Stalin's death are generally familiar: a military adventure in Korea being fought by proxy which had to be supplied; the maintenance of power in an extensive satellite area; and a generally aggressive posture toward the West which involved the Soviet government in a vast armaments race. These commitments required large economic expenditures which could not but help to aggravate the sources of internal pressure which will be discussed shortly, and they were dependent upon a steady control over various instruments of coercion which the very nature of the succession crisis brought into question. The effectiveness of these exter-

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