The Implications of the Radcliffe Report for Canada

Abstract

The Radcliffe Committee was appointed by Treasury Minute in May, 1957, “to inquire into the working of the monetary and credit system … [of the United Kingdom], … and to make recommendations.” It held eighty-eight meetings, collected three volumes of written evidence and one volume of evidence given orally, compiled new statistical information, and finally on July 30, 1959, presented a unanimous report to the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury. The public saw the Report three weeks later.The prestigious composition of the Committee and the controversial ground which it was required to investigate alone ensured widespread attention for the Report. But the virtual flood of detailed comment emanating from academic economists and financial journalists in the United Kingdom is not entirely explained by this; nor even by the Committee's controversial views on matters of monetary theory and central banking practice. Because the views of the Committee on monetary policy and theory are not always fully developed, and in some instances appear to be ambiguous and contradictory, the Report offers limitless opportunities for articles on “What Radcliffe Really Meant,” including, of course, analyses of the essential deficiencies of the interpretations suggested. Unfortunately, the Report is such that the views of the Committee are easily misinterpreted, a danger of which this writer is aware, but one which he may not have succeeded in avoiding in every instance.