The Implications of Salary for the Quality of Nominations to the Federal District Courts, 1964–2012

Abstract

Many have expressed concern over the working conditions of federal district court judges who face comparatively low salaries in contrast to those in peer professions. As a means of enticing new judges of the highest quality, Chief Justices Rehnquist and Roberts have urged Congress and the president to increase judicial pay. However, scholars have not conducted a systematic, empirical investigation of whether higher salaries do, in fact, attract better prospective judges. We turn our attention to this issue. We first develop an exhaustive dataset of ABA ratings for over 1,800 nominees to the federal district courts from 1964 to 2012. We next model the effects of salary on the quality of nominations and confirmations. We find that salary is an important determinant of both the quality of candidates nominated and those confirmed to the federal bench. Our findings have critical implications for public policy, as our results confirm the need for better pay for federal judges.