The Implementation of Desegregation Plans Since Brown

Abstract

IntroductionWhen Supreme Court overturned doctrine of separate but equal in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas (Brown I) (1954) as violation of Equal Protection Clause of 14th Amendment, it fashioned decision with no immediate relief. The question of relief was set for reargument, and an invitation to submit briefs to aid in formulation of relief was extended to attorneys general of United States and states where de jure school segregation was imposed. Although reargument was held year later in Brown II (1955), Court still failed to provide clear guidelines to end de jure segregation in public schools. Instead, it required only a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance (p. 300). Thus, whether Black student could be admitted to formerly all-White school or vice versa constituted desegregation was left unanswered. The Court provided no definitions of desegregation and no guidance regarding how it was to be accomplished.The issue was further confounded by Court's now-famous admonishment to states to use all deliberate speed in implementing mandates of Brown II (p. 301). This phrase soon took on mantel of black humor: Blacks, it was noted, wanted speed, while Whites wanted to be deliberate. Brown II, with its high-sounding phrases founded on notion that school systems would make good-faith efforts to comply with mandates of Brown I, became more symbol of victory than definitive statement or direction for remedy.Following Brown II, White community, with few guidelines from courts, moved deliberately. As would be expected, little desegregation happened. Still, even though little was happening and even less planning was being done, some progress was made. Amidst flurry of state laws obstructing desegregation, political posturing by elected officials, retaliation against civil rights lawyers, and open defiance by local citizen groups, most of southern states previously operating under de jure segregation took some affirmative actions.One of early tests of Brown arose in Little Rock, Arkansas, where desegregation plan formulated by local school authorities was opposed by state legislature and by governor, who called in National Guard to prevent Black students from attending formerly all-White high school. The governor's actions were enjoined by federal district court. Subsequently, in Cooper v. Aaron (1958), Supreme Court unanimously held that desegregation in Little Rock was to proceed and that Brown could not be overcome by state legislative actions. However, like Brown, Cooper provided no guidelines as to what constituted desegregated school. Hence, many districts proceeded with notion that accepting few assigned or voluntary Black student transfers into formerly all-White schools satisfied requirements of Brown.As years following Brown passed with little appreciable change in racial makeup of former de jure school systems, Court became impatient. In McNeese v. Board of Education for Community Unit School District 187, Chaokia, Illinois (1963), Court held that it was not necessary to exhaust administrative remedies in school desegregation cases before relief could be sought in federal court. McNeese was quickly followed by Griffin v. Prince Edward County Board of Education (1964), in which Court held that the time for mere 'deliberate speed' had run out (p. 234). Despite these stern words, however, little significant desegregation occurred.FREEDOM OF CHOICELittle was accomplished in initial desegregation efforts following Brown because no clear judicial guidelines were set forth. While few districts attempted to desegregate by allowing handful of Blacks to attend formerly all-White schools on voluntary basis, no efforts were made to assign or entice White children to attend formerly all-Black schools. …