Abstract
AbstractI consider the claim that social rights cannot be constitutionalized and protected by the judiciary, because the latter is unable to adjudicate rights which, by nature, are vague and cannot constitute a solid basis for assessing governmental policy‐making. I reject this practical objection to constitutional social rights whilst taking on board some of its insights, by looking at the ways in which social rights are given specific content by institutions such as the ILO and the UN, and at the way constitutional social rights are dealt with by some domestic constitutional courts.
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