The Imperial German Navy in the Pacific 1900-1914 as an instrument of Weltpolitik, with special reference to Australasia in its operational planning

Abstract

This thesis shows the threat posed to exports of raw materials and food from East Asia, Australasia, and India to Britain, the vulnerability of whose trade routes to attack in war was regarded by German naval planners as the 'Achilles heel' by which Britain could be crippled economically and quickly brought to terms. This was an important, if secondary, aspect of the main clash of battleship fleets in the North Sea, and of Germany's far-reaching worldpolitical aims which were partly to be achieved by the Navy as the prime instrument of foreign policy.With the overwhelming superiority of the Royal Navy ensuring the domination of the world's trade routes, and thus in the German view able to influence unduly if not control German economic and political expansion, there appeared to be no alternative but to engage Britain if Germany were to flourish. Necessary for an understanding of the German rationale is the discussion of economic determinism, the inexorable advance of 'higher' cultures and Germany's mission, and the coming 'redistribution' of the world. These views were propagated by the academic elite whose political and social influence was considerable. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz believed from history, and the writings of the influential American navalist A.T. Mahan, that a maritime Power could not be defeated by cruiser (commerce) warfare as long as its battle fleet remained unconquered. This inevitably led to the battleship construction program commencing in 1897, but the role of cruisers, though limited, was specific and their tasks were planned in detail. In the years before 1914, the German naval leadership intensively occupied itself with the problems of conducting a largescale war. There was still a considerable section of opinion in favour of cruiser construction rather than reliance on battleships. The reasoning and application of each view is evaluated. The conduct of successful commerce warfare against Britain was dependent on strategically located overseas bases, which Germany did not possess and could not obtain without the danger of friction if not conflict, not only with Britain but also with the United States, as it expanded its position in Asia and the Pacific. The examination of Germany's attempted and actual acquisition of bases and support stations in the region, and their relationship to operational planning, is crucial to the development of defence issues at this time.Coaling and provisioning in wartime was essential for the effective operation of the Cruiser Squadron. For over a decade the Navy had surveyed remote harbours in Asia, the Dutch Indies, Micronesian and New Guinean waters which would be suitable for the secret assembly and conversion of merchant vessels. Contractual arrangements were made with shipping companies to bring coal, food, and munitions from neutral harbours to waiting steamers designated as auxiliary cruisers before the official declaration of hostilities. The establishment of a Zone system for East Asia and Australasia under the direction of naval officers and Consular officials was to ensure this proceeded smoothly. Associated with this was the intelligence system which used Consular officials and local persons of German nationality or descent to collect information on all aspects of regional defence arrangements.The thesis examines in detail the operational planning of the Cruiser Squadron, which entailed attacks on shipping and to a limited extent coastal fortifications, in the entire region from China to the Canadian and United States Pacific coast, south to Australia and New Zealand, on the trade routes passing through the narrow defiles of the Dutch Indies, and at points of convergence in the Indian Ocean, with the aim of halting exports to Britain by the Suez, Cape, and South American routes. It evaluates the scale, prospects for success, and reasons for failure of this planning. Finally, there is an assessment of the Cruiser Squadron's situation and options in August 1914, and reasons for the limited extent of its success. Nevertheless, considerable disruption eventuated due to the uncertainty of the Squadron's whereabouts until it reached South American waters. Above all, it has to be kept in mind what was intended, to be implemented. The extent of planned operations in the Asian-Pacific-Indian Ocean region - an integral part of Germany's world-political strategy - is brought to light from the German archives for the first time, and must be regarded as a significant element in the broader picture of contemporary Australasian concerns in the years before the First World War.