The Impending Crisis in Egypt

Abstract

For Egypt to have severe political, social, and economic problems is nothing new. Those it is facing today are particularly acute, however, and the government is not dealing with them effectively. Instead of allowing increased opportunities for political participation to alleviate political pressure caused by economic austerity, the government of President Husni Mubarak is seeking to contain most manifestations of political autonomy, and the state's capacity for such containment is being sorely tested. If, ultimately, its containment capability proves to be inadequate, the Egyptian state will be more or less alone in confronting a revolutionary crisis. None of Egypt's allies, including the United States, is prepared or equipped to assist. Economic and political correlates of potential systemic collapse are evident. First is a severe and protracted recession following a boom, a cyclical pattern often associated with political destabilization. The vast majority of Egyptians increasingly are suffering from relative deprivation, as the gap between their expectations and the reality of their living conditions widens. Relative deprivation often translates into political discontent, as the examples of Iran and Algeria have demonstrated.(1) A second indicator of serious trouble is the inappropriate governmental response to economic challenges. Although economic reform achieved considerable gains in stabilizing the macroeconomy following the 1991 Persian Gulf War, it has not been extended to the vital areas of institutionalization of the regulatory environment and privatization. In fact, the most difficult aspect of economic reform--structural adjustment--has yet to commence. The Egyptian economy is suspended between a rigid monetarism, on the one hand, and an inefficient state capitalism on the other. As a consequence, growth of the private sector continues to be retarded by a regulatory environment attuned to defending the interests of the public sector. Third, political reform has not been successful. Instead of seeking to broaden its base of political support, the regime has resisted trying new ideas and bringing fresh recruits into the political elite. It has chosen to stand firm, betting that the state apparatus alone--without any support from civil society--is strong enough to eradicate any insurrection. Yet, sclerosis in channels of elite recruitment has produced a gerontocratic, unrepresentative elite. A fourth and related development is the loss of legitimacy that has accompanied the growing political isolation of the regime. Intellectuals appear to have deserted it, a development which, in other settings, has been a harbinger of revolution. None of the major political tendencies--Nasserist, Communist, free marketeer, liberal democratic, or Islamist--considers the regime to be representative of its views or sympathetic to its interests. While Mubarak disposes of the state power he inherited from Gamal Abdul Nasser and Anwar al-Sadat, he can neither claim the legacy of either man, nor claim to be the progenitor of a new ism. Many high-ranking officials complain uncharacteristically about the lack of leadership.(2) Rumors of corruption among high officials, including the office of the president, contribute to widespread disillusionment. Egypt seems to be in a state of disequilibration, whereby the regime is not believed to share the ideas, aspirations, and values of society.(3) A fifth correlate of political breakdown is the presence of an armed insurgency. Prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Islamic militancy took the form of intermittent violent acts. Since 1992, however, sporadic terrorism has grown into an insurrection that has affected directly the lives of thousands of Egyptians. While the insurgents seem incapable of constituting an alternative government, they may succeed in destabilizing the incumbent one. Sixth, the bedrock of the regime--the military and security services--shows signs of being fractured. …