Abstract

We analyze the impacts of an antitrust investigation on the purchasing practices of a buying collaboration and its common bidding agent. Using a repeated cross section of prices across procurement auctions that were and were not subjected to the investigation, we find that auction prices in the targeted auctions: (i) significantly increased as soon as the targets were made aware they were under investigation; (ii) remained higher as long as the investigation was open; and (iii) systematically declined to the same low pre-knowledge state after the closure of the investigation without prosecution. Finally, the counterfactual impact on auction prices by the removal of the common bidding agent and the demise of the buying collaboration at a later date was on par with the impacts of the investigation.

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.