Abstract

Abstract Stakeholder cooperation can be vital in managing conservation conflicts. Laboratory experiments show cooperation is less likely in the presence of uncertainty. Much less is known about how stakeholders in real‐life conservation conflicts respond to different types of uncertainty. We tested the effects of different sources of uncertainty on cooperative behaviour using a framed field experiment and interviews. The experiment compared a baseline scenario of perfect certainty with scenarios including either: (a) scientific uncertainty about the effectiveness of a conflict‐reduction intervention; (b) administrative uncertainty about intervention funding; or (c) political uncertainty about the extent of community support. We applied these scenarios to a conservation conflict in the Outer Hebrides, Scotland, involving the management of geese to simultaneously meet both conservation and farming objectives. We asked 149 crofters (small‐scale farmers) if they would commit to cooperate with others by helping fund a goose management plan given the three sources of uncertainty. On average, intention to cooperate was highest (99%) in scenarios without uncertainty, and lowest under administrative uncertainty (77%). Scientific uncertainty and political uncertainty both had less of an effect, with over 95% of crofters predicted to be willing to cooperate in these scenarios. Crofters who indicated concern for other crofters suffering the impact of geese were more likely to cooperate. The longer an individual had been a crofter, the less likely they were to cooperate. Synthesis and applications. Crofters’ intention to cooperate is high but lessened by uncertainty, especially over the commitment from other stakeholders such as government, to cooperate on goose management. Existing cooperation on goose management may be at risk if uncertainty is not reduced outright or commitments between parties are not strengthened. This has wide applicability, supporting the need for researchers and government advisers to: (a) determine how uncertainty will impact intention of stakeholders to cooperate; and (b) take steps (such as uncertainty reduction, communication or acceptance) to reduce the negative impact of uncertainty on cooperation.

Highlights

  • Conflicts in conservation are ubiquitous around the globe and are damaging to both conservation efforts and people's lives (Redpath et al, 2013)

  • The experiment compared a baseline scenario of perfect certainty with scenarios including either: (a) scientific uncertainty about the effectiveness of a conflict-reduction intervention; (b) administrative uncertainty about intervention funding; or (c) political uncertainty about the extent of community support

  • Scientific uncertainty and political uncertainty both had less of an effect, with over 95% of crofters predicted to be willing to cooperate in these scenarios

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Summary

| INTRODUCTION

Conflicts in conservation are ubiquitous around the globe and are damaging to both conservation efforts and people's lives (Redpath et al, 2013). We use an experimental economics method to explore how three types of uncertainty (scientific uncertainty, administrative uncertainty and political uncertainty) influence the intention to cooperate, of people in a real-­life conservation conflict. Stakeholders involved in a goose conflict can include those who: suffer directly from goose damage; wish to maintain the conservation status of the geese and their habitat; are responsible for scientific support of management; are required to fulfil practical management activities; and, provide funding or practical support. Resident greylag goose (Anser anser) numbers have been increasing steadily from historic low points in the mid-­twentieth century, to record highs While this is seen by many as a conservation success story, the geese are responsible for damage to arable crops and to pasture intended for livestock. 2. determine which variables (e.g. crofting location, time spent as a crofter, experiences of goose damage) were most important for describing cooperative behaviour

| MATERIALS AND METHODS
| DISCUSSION
Findings
| CONCLUSIONS
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