Abstract
It is widely agreed that the entry of third-party remanufacturers (TPRs) hurts original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) because remanufacturing cannibalises the new product sales. In this paper, motivated by the practice of mobile phone remanufacturing, we develop a game theoretical model to revisit the impact of third-party remanufacturing on a forward supply chain in which one OEM purchases critical components from one dominant supplier. The OEM may operate the remanufacturing business as cost-efficient as the TPR. Our analytical results show that regardless of the OEM’s remanufacturing capability, third-party remanufacturing could be beneficial to the OEM in that the supplier would lower the wholesale price as a response to the entry of the TPR; in addition, compared with the case without remanufacturing, third-party remanufacturing is always detrimental to the supplier, but the supplier should not always attempt to deter the entry of the TPR because third-party remanufacturing could be less detrimental than the OEM’s in-house remanufacturing. Under certain conditions, the two players in the forward supply chain both prefer third-party remanufacturing over in-house remanufacturing. The key intuition driving this finding is that third-party remanufacturing makes the OEM and the supplier allied; while in-house remanufacturing makes them against each other.
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