Abstract
Existing evidence suggests that the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) may be beneficial to US investors, but that foreign firms are perhaps less likely to list in the USA after SOX. This raises the question of whether foreign firms avoid listing in the USA after SOX because the Act imposes unnecessary costs upon firms. The objective of this article is to reconcile the US and international evidence by distinguishing between the effect of SOX on controlling shareholders and managers of foreign firms and the effect on minority investors of these firms. Our results suggest that insiders of foreign firms believe that the regulation makes the extraction of value from minority investors more difficult and costly for them. Outside investors in foreign firms, on the other hand, seem on average to believe that SOX is beneficial to them. The combination of these results reconciles the existing US and international evidence regarding SOX.
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