The impact of strategic inventory and procurement strategies on green product design in a two-period supply chain

Abstract

This study analyses the impact of power structures and strategic inventory on the development-intensive and marginal-cost-intensive green product types under three procurement strategies. The results suggest that (i) in the manufacturer-Stackelberg game, the retailer retains strategic inventory to earn higher profits. The retailer's decision improves profit for the manufacturer and greening level of the product; (ii) for the marginal-cost-intensive green product, the power structures and procurement strategies cannot make any impact on the greening level and the retailer cannot build up strategic inventory under retailer-Stackelberg game; (iii) under the Nash game, the procurement decision creates conflict between the supply chain members for marginal-cost-intensive green products; (iv) if the retailer does not maintain strategic inventory or procures product in a single lot, then the manufacturer prefers to produce marginal-cost-intensive products and retailer prefers to sale development-intensive products to receive maximum profits under manufacturer-Stackelberg game. The optimal preferences are concurrent under retailer-Stackelberg game, but not under the Nash game; (v) single-period equilibrium solutions may exhibit sub-optimal characteristics, but two-period planning can lead to exemplary outcomes in the perspective of the greening level and profits of the supply chain members.