Abstract
As the capital market develops and matures, the requirements for the quality of accounting information of listed companies gradually increase. Under these circumstances, it is essential to verify whether implementing this system can improve the quality of accounting information and realize the effective allocation of resources. In order to empirically test the governance effect of short selling on the accounting information disclosure of listed companies, this paper uses the data of A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2011, uses the differential and probit model, and finds that short selling has no significant impact on the quality of information disclosure. China officially implemented the short-selling system on March 31, 2010. During the early stages of implementation, the trading volume of short-selling was small, and the scale of short-selling of listed companies was also small. Therefore, short-selling transactions in a short period of time will not significantly affect the quality of accounting information disclosure.
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