The impact of relationship stickiness and memory on the evolution of individual behavior

Abstract

This study investigates the dynamics of individual behavior and decision-making processes shaped by changes in personal relationships and preferences, using the prisoner’s dilemma game as a framework. The research focuses on the effects of relationship stickiness and memory on behavior evolution and network structural changes, considering two types of initial relationship networks. The findings indicate that as the number of games increases, there is a general trend of gradual increases in the average relationship stickiness, topological changes, and network heterogeneity. Notably, networks with greater initial heterogeneity, such as scale-free networks, better facilitate individual cooperation. Contrary to previous studies, the stable density of cooperators does not consistently increase with higher temptation gains. This suggests that individuals’ adaptive strategies, which include changing neighbors, can foster cooperation even under greater temptations. Additionally, an increase in the sensitivity coefficient correlates with increases in the final cooperator density, network heterogeneity, and topological changes. As individual memory and temptation gain rise, network heterogeneity measures tend to increase, while measures of topological change generally decrease. A sharp decline in the stable density of cooperators coincides almost synchronously with a rapid increase in network heterogeneity and a decrease in topological changes. This research reveals how relationship stickiness and memory impact individual cooperation, enhancing our understanding of the underlying mechanisms driving cooperative behaviors in complex networks.