Abstract

ABSTRACTPrivatization of communal land among a community of pastoralists in northern Kenya creates a gap in social institutions relating to land inheritance. This analysis shows that the emergence of a new rule for inheritance is a complex social process and that new rules do not arise automatically. Using theories of institutions and collective action, this study examines the process through which rules of inheritance are emerging in Siambu since land privatization. Drawing on in‐depth interviews, observations and household surveys, this study reveals why collective action around inheritance norms has been difficult to achieve. In the absence of such action, no single norm of inheritance has emerged. Rather, several different practices currently co‐exist. A considerable amount of evidence suggests that livestock inheritance rules that favour eldest sons will become the norm for land as well, but there are also reasons to doubt this outcome. What this case demonstrates is that institutional gaps are not necessarily or automatically filled; institutions do not simply arise when needed. When collective action fails, multiple practices and norms may co‐exist leading to a certain degree of institutional instability.

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