Abstract
We consider the impact of a mandatory information disclosure on bank safety in a spatial model of banking competition, in which a bank’s probability of success depends on the quality of its risk measurement and management systems. Under Basel capital requirements, this quality is at least partially disclosed to market participants by the Pillar 3 disclosures. We show that the regulator can improve the safety of the banking system by tightening the disclosure requirements. Furthermore, the stricter the disclosure requirements are the bigger is a positive impact of an increase in capital requirements on bank safety.
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