Abstract
The practice of appointing insiders to the compensation committee has drawn considerable criticism since compensation committees play an important role in executive compensation decisions. This paper examines the association between the firm’s ownership structure and the decision to use insiders on the compensation committee. The paper finds that CEO stock ownership is positively related to the presence of insiders on the compensation committee whereas the stockholdings of non‐executive employees, as a group, is negatively related to the presence of insiders.
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