Abstract
Can the design of governmental institutions promote timely governance? This article investigates this question by examining the relationship between the design of fiscal institutions and budgetary delays across the fifty states. These budgetary offices are created by lawmakers to advance sound fiscal policy and sustainable public finance. This article argues that the unbiased information provided by nonpartisan budget offices minimize the likelihood of budgetary delay as well as lessen how long budgetary stalemate persists when a delay occurs. The findings suggest that nonpartisan fiscal institutions do not prevent budgetary delay but substantially reduce the duration of budgetary gridlock.
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