The impact of market design and clean energy incentives on strategic generation investments and resource adequacy in low-carbon electricity markets

Abstract

Well-designed electricity markets play a crucial role in maintaining reliable electric power systems, which are critical in modern society. This study examines the impact of different electricity market designs and clean energy incentive schemes on supporting renewable energy integration and achieving clean energy goals. To this end, we utilize a game-theoretical generation expansion planning model where generation companies make investment and retirement decisions to maximize their expected profit. The model is structured as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) and solved using a diagonalization approach combined with progressive hedging. We analyze three types of electricity market designs: an energy-only market, a capacity market, and a clean energy market, and consider a wide range of market parameters resulting in 14 total scenarios. Wind and solar capacity comprise the majority of new investments in all considered scenarios, but the resultant system planning reserve margin (PRM) can differ significantly depending on market parameters. We also find that profit-driven investments lead to lower PRMs than a traditional system cost minimization approach. These individual scenario results further demonstrate how different market designs and clean energy incentive schemes may influence investor decision-making and impact resource adequacy throughout the clean energy transition.