The impact of international work experience, functional background and career concerns on CEO investment decisions

Abstract

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of chief executive officer (CEO) international work experience, functional background and career concerns on managerially-distorted investment decisions.Design/methodology/approachThis paper focuses on S&P 500 publicly held US manufacturing companies during the period from 2009 to 2012. The data related to the CEOs’ international experience and their functional background experience are manually collected from Business Week’s Corporate Elite. Financial data is retrieved from COMPUSTAT database. The data for CEO tenure and age are retrieved from the ExecuComp database. Besides ordinary least squares regression, this paper conducts two-stage least squares regression analysis. Endogeneity and additional tests are also considered in this paper.FindingsThe findings show that CEO international work experience may not reduce under-investment, but it may exacerbate over-investment. CEO throughput functional background may exacerbate under-investment, but it may not reduce over-investment. Furthermore, CEO career concerns are useful in reducing the inefficient investments caused by international work experience and throughput functional background. These results remain similar when potential self-selection bias, as well as alternative measures of career concerns and investment efficiency, are considered.Originality/valueThis paper contributes to the existing literature in the following ways: first, while a significant amount of attention has been paid to how investment decisions are affected by financial reporting quality and material internal control weaknesses, there has been little evidence accumulated related to how managers’ international experience, professional background and career concerns affect investment inefficiency. The authors attempt to fill this gap. Second, the authors manually collect the international experience and functional backgrounds of CEOs working for S&P 500 US manufacturing companies. This unique data set makes it possible to complement previous studies by investigating the effects of managerial international experience and functional background on investment behavior. Finally, previous theoretical studies have long recognized that managers’ career concerns affect their corporate investment decisions. These studies suggest that young CEOs have a greater incentive to signal their abilities by adopting more active and possibly riskier investment strategies, thus raising the moral hazard problem with regard to firm investments. The authors enrich these studies by showing that work experience alleviates the moral hazard problem with respect to young CEOs’ investment decisions.