Abstract
The aim of the present research is to study the impact of financing within a company and institutional investors control on cash flows resulting from investment fluctuations in companies listed on Tehran Stock Exchange. To this end, historical data of 103 companies listed on Tehran Stock Exchange in the time period of 2007 - 2012 were extracted and analyzed by using panel data. Results indicated that the more increase in cash flows, the more companies have interest for investment. In other words, investment fluctuations are sensitive to cash flows. Also, increased financing within a company reduces company's interest for investment of cash flows and vice versa. To this end, increased supervision of institutional investors increases company's interest for investment of cash flows and reduced supervision of institutional investors reduces company's interest for investment of cash flows. However, this effect was not statistically significant. Also, it was indicated that when there was an increase in activity volume of a company, on the basis of assets, there was an increase in company interest for investment of cash flows and a decrease in activity volume of a company, on the basis of assets, and the company interest for investment of cash flows. Also, increased cash dividends payment increases company interest for investment of cash flows and reduced cash dividends payment reduces company's interest for investment of cash flows. Age of the company and financial leverages did not have any effect on investment fluctuations sensitivity to cash flows.
Highlights
According to internal resource hypothesis, companies for taking advantage of investment opportunities need cash
The aim of the present research is to study the impact of financing within a company and institutional investors control on cash flows resulting from investment fluctuations in companies listed on Tehran Stock Exchange
The effect of internal financing of companies and institutional investors control have been studied on cash flows resulting from investment fluctuations with the use of evidences from Tehran Stock Exchange
Summary
According to internal resource hypothesis, companies for taking advantage of investment opportunities need cash. Existence of some imperfections in markets, such as information asymmetry and agency costs, increases the cost of external capital comparing to internal capital (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Myers & Majluf, 1984) This difference in cost is caused because external capital financers (potential future investors) comparing to managers have less information about investment opportunities and do not have sufficient power for ensuring that managers will act in their interests. The capital produced through company operations - belongs to the current shareholders of a company These shareholders can monitor managers through governance mechanisms such as the board of the directors or through controlling institutional investors. If these monitoring mechanisms are effective, agency costs that external capital financers are facing will be considerably higher than the costs that internal capital financers are facing (Pawlina & Renneboog, 2005)
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