Abstract
This study investigates the impact of institutional shareholding on corporate investment efficiency and identifies the role played by information asymmetry as well as agency costs. The results show that (1) institutional shareholding promotes corporate investment efficiency, with state-owned institutions playing a more pronounced role. (2) Institutional investors' shareholding is negatively related to information asymmetry. (3) Institutional investors' shareholding is negatively related to agency costs. (4) Institutional investors' shareholding can improve corporate investment efficiency by reducing corporate information asymmetry and agency costs, which are reflected in reducing corporate information opacity and analysts' forecast divergence.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
