Abstract
The study of strategic customer behavior in service systems constitutes an important and dynamic trend in queueing theory. This chapter presents several techniques for the control of information in a given system and their impact on strategic customer behavior, the throughput, the social welfare and a monopolist's revenue. First, it presents some basic concepts from game theory that will be used in the sequel. Then, the chapter presents the analysis of the two “extreme” models regarding the information that is provided to the customers: the unobservable model and the observable model. Subsequently, it briefly describes the main findings from the comparison of these models. Then, the chapter also describes significant ideas that have appeared in the literature that bridge the observable and unobservable versions of a given model. More specifically, it discusses, respectively, partially observable models, heterogeneously observable models and observable-with-delay models.
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