Abstract
This M.A. dissertation presents a study of the influence of financial distress on CEO compensation in the United States. It focuses on the four main components of executive compensation: salary, bonus, restricted stock and stock options. More specifically, I apply linear regression to panel data on publicly listed firms from 2007 to 2016. Financial information and compensation data are drawn from Compustat and ExecuComp. This study reveals that base salary and discretionary bonuses tend to be unaffected by distress, whereas performance-based bonuses and restricted stock are significantly lower in distressed firms. Stock options showed ambiguous results: although the fair value of options was not seen to change, there was a significant decrease in the value realized upon exercising stock options.
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