Abstract
We study the impact of a reform that extended employment protection to temporary agency workers. Using a difference-in-difference research design, we show that plants more exposed to the regulation experienced a decrease in revenues and total employment, and that the latter effect was attenuated in industries with high elasticity of substitution between agency and nonagency workers. We also find that labor misallocation increased as a consequence of the regulation. A model of labor demand in the presence of agency work rationalizes these results. (JEL J22, J23, J31, K31, L60, M51, O15)
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
