Abstract
This study demonstrates that multimember districts (MMDs) complicate ballots, reduce voter information, and increase incentives for strategic voting in ways that reduce voter participation. Using data from three states that elect members of at least one legislative chamber from both single‐member districts (SMDs) and MMDs, we test hypotheses about the impact on MMDs on ballot drop‐off (selecting fewer candidates for an office than permissible) and roll‐off (not voting in down‐ballot races). We find support for both sets of hypotheses, with the strongest results related to ballot drop‐off. The results have broad implications for voter participation, representation, and election administration in the many states and localities that use MMDs to elect public officials.
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