Abstract

I examine the impact of direct mayoral elections on taxation in Indonesia. I find that districts led by directly elected mayors tax less than districts with council appointed executives. Uniquely in the literature, I also determine that districts with directly elected mayors and, by implication, districts with council appointed heads both tax more than their counterparts with central government appointed executives.

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