Abstract

In accordance with Senegal’s decentralisation policy, important forest management tasks, including the right to allocate charcoal production rights, have been transferred to rural councils. This paper investigates the impact of these institutional reforms on charcoal production practices using the environmental entitlement framework developed by Leach et al. [Environmental entitlements: dynamics and institutions in community-based natural resource management. World Development 27 (2) (1999) 225]. The councils have not been able to turn their new endowments into entitlements because they lack sufficient strength and legitimacy. Informal institutions, notably the coalition between merchants, state agents and village chiefs, continue to run the charcoal business and are hardly affected by decentralisation efforts. Most rural people, especially those relying solely on agriculture for sustenance, do not benefit at all from the charcoal trade. They do suffer from the environmental costs it brings with it, however. Although tensions between pro-exploitation actors and pro-conservation actors are evident, the pro-exploitation actors’ firm grip on the informal institutions will probably lead to a prolonged subversion of the laws that seek to enhance local control and to sustain the forest.

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