The impact of corporate governance statement assurance on financial professionals’ decisions

Abstract

Corporate Governance (CG) reporting receives increasing attention. This study examines the impact of voluntary CG statement assurance on financial analysts’ and bankers’ decisions. An experiment with a 2 × 2 + 1 between-subject design was conducted. The independent variables comprise the assurance provider (Big Four statutory auditor vs. another Big Four audit firm) and assurance level (limited vs. reasonable). Additionally, a control condition without assurance provision is used. The participants’ reliance on the CG statement, their likelihood to recommend an investment in shares of the fictitious company, their credit risk assessment, and the likelihood to purchase shares of the fictitious company themselves served as dependent variables. Our results indicate that CG statement assurance increases the likelihood for investment recommendation. Moreover, they do not indicate a significant impact of the type of assurance provider. Reasonable assurance predominantly results in decisions of financial professionals which are more favorable for the fictitious company than limited assurance.