The impact of consumer behavior on preannounced pricing for a dual‐channel supply chain

Abstract

AbstractThis study discusses a dual‐channel supply chain in which a manufacturer sells a regular‐priced product through dual channels in the normal sales period and only sells overstocked products through the direct channel in the discounted sales period in the presence of strategic consumers. The manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader to adopt a preannounced pricing policy. This study first proposes demand functions for a two‐period dual‐channel model by incorporating consumer utility functions. Based on the demand functions, optimal pricing strategies for both manufacturer and retailer are established. The results show that the manufacturer prefers to raise prices in both periods for consumers with a short delivery lead time. However, counterintuitively, the selling prices set by the manufacturer do not decrease as the degree of consumer patience increases. Finally, there is a Pareto zone under a certain condition where both the manufacturer and the retailer in the two‐period dual‐channel model outperform their counterparts in terms of profit in the single‐period dual‐channel model.