Abstract

ABSTRACTThis study aims at better understanding how, and to what extent, perceptions of a policy instrument’s distributional effects impact on policy support, focusing on the case of CO2 taxes on petrol in Sweden. Through a large-scale (N = 5000) randomized survey experiment with a 2 × 3 factorial design, the extent to which perceptions of fairness determine attitudes to a suggested increase of the Swedish CO2 tax is explored. Furthermore, the study considers whether these effects change with the level of the suggested tax increase, as well as whether negative sentiments can be alleviated by combining it with a compensatory measure in the shape of a simultaneous income tax cut financed by the revenues from the tax increase. The results show that a higher tax increase is both viewed as more unfair and enjoys weaker support. Furthermore, compensatory measures can be a powerful policy design tool to increase perceptions of the policy as fair, but the effect of compensation on policy support is conditioned by the individual’s left–right ideological position. Whereas people self-identifying to the right react favourably to compensatory measures, people self-identifying to the left become less supportive of a tax increase when combined with a simultaneous cut in income taxes.Key policy insightsPerceptions of fairness are highly important for explaining public support for climate policy tools, specifically CO2 taxes.Compensatory measures can be a powerful policy design tool to increase perceptions of the policy as less unfair.However, the effect of compensatory measures on policy support is conditioned by ideological position, and only successful among people to the ideological right.In contexts dominated by right-wing ideals, a combination of a tax and a compensatory scheme may be a successful route forward towards increased climate policy support.In left-oriented contexts the results imply that a CO2 tax without compensation seems more likely to increase support.

Highlights

  • At the Paris Climate Conference (Conference of the Parties (COP) 21) in December 2015, the international community adopted a landmark global climate deal

  • Among people who are ideologically oriented to the right, the expected effects appear, while among those who are oriented to the left, and to some extent those in the middle of the ideological scale, the two types of compensatory schemes being explored here do not seem to have the intended effects on support. The aim of this experimental study was to disentangle the interplay between perceptions of fairness and public support for one specific climate policy measure, widely regarded as one of the most cost-effective means of limiting emissions and changing public behaviour: a CO2 tax

  • Reviewing the results in the light of the five hypotheses derived throughout the theory section, it is concluded that both H1 and H2 were confirmed for the full sample

Read more

Summary

Introduction

At the Paris Climate Conference (Conference of the Parties (COP) 21) in December 2015, the international community adopted a landmark global climate deal. This multilateral agreement sets out a global action plan to put the world on track to avoid harmful climate change and requires each party to prepare a Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the global mitigation goal. Emission reducing targets under their NDCs, the possibilities of relying upon voluntary action and lowhanging fruits in terms of policy changes will steadily decrease as the NDCs are intended to become more rigorous over time. Rather, achieving greater GHG emission-cuts presupposes behavioural changes among a range of societal actors, and subsequently that governments adopt increasingly more stringent domestic policies governing such changes. On high-salience issues, in particular, there is ample evidence that public opinion both constrains (Burstein, 2003; Wallner, 2008) and directs the actions of decision makers (Erikson, MacKuen, & Stimson, 2002; Soroka & Wlezien, 2010)

Objectives
Results
Conclusion
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call