The Impact of CEO and CFO Equity Incentives on Audit Scope and Perceived Risks as Revealed Through Audit Fees

Abstract

SUMMARY:In 2013, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) proposed an amendment to Auditing Standard No. 12 (PCAOB 2010) that would require auditors to consider executive compensation in audit planning because of potential fraud risk associated with equity incentives. We use the association between audit fees and CEO and CFO equity incentives to infer whether auditors increase audit scope and perceive greater risk as equity incentives increase. Equity incentives are defined as the sensitivity of the value of executives' equity portfolios to changes in share price (delta incentive) and to changes in return volatility (vega incentive). We find a positive association between audit fees and vega, but not delta. However, when we interact vega with proxies for residual auditor business risk, we find that the fee premiums for risk decrease as vega increases. Our results suggest that auditors do consider executive compensation in audit planning.