THE IMPACT OF BOARD COMPOSITION AND OWNERSHIP ON AUDIT QUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM LARGE UK COMPANIES

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of board composition and ownership structure on audit quality in the UK prior to the adoption of the recommendations of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (5). In this study I use audit fees as a proxy for audit quality and seek to investigate whether the proportion of non-executives, the extent of managerial ownership or ownership by large blockholders influences the extent of auditing, and consequently, the audit fee. Utilizing data from a sample of 402 quoted companies I find that the proportion of non-executive directors has a significant positive impact on audit fees. I also find that audit fees are negatively related to the proportion of equity owned by executive directors. I find no evidence that ownership by large blockholders (institutional or otherwise) or CEO/chairman duality has a significant impact on audit fees. Overall, the findings suggest that non-executive directors encourage more intensive audits as a complement to their own monitoring role while the reduction in agency costs expected through significant managerial ownership results in a reduced need for intensive auditing.