The Impact of Blockchain on Enterprises Sharing Real Data Based on Dynamic Evolutionary Game Analysis

Abstract

The use of blockchain technology can ensure that data remains untampered with once it is on the chain. However, it doesn’t guarantee the authenticity of data before it enters the chain. In this study, we developed a three-party dynamic evolutionary game model involving core enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and financial institutions. Our findings indicate that a blockchain supply chain (BSC) generates more economic benefits than a traditional supply chain (TSC). We then built a dynamic evolutionary game model between core enterprises and SMEs, which revealed that SMEs are influenced by core enterprises and tend to adopt the action strategies of the latter. Additionally, we developed a dynamic evolutionary game model between core enterprises and financial institutions and compared the reward and punishment mechanisms with the synergy payoff mechanism. In the reward and punishment mechanisms, the game is a zero-sum game, where one party’s gains come at the expense of the other party. This mechanism has certain limitations and must meet specific conditions to improve the willingness of enterprises to share data. On the other hand, the synergy payoff mechanism enhances the authenticity of shared data by increasing the payoff for participants. When core enterprises play games with SMEs, the probability of core enterprises uploading real data and the distribution ratio of synergy payoff show an inverted U-shape. Similarly, core enterprises and financial institutions have comparable results in allocating synergy payoff. To leverage the synergy payoff mechanism, the distribution proportion of players participating in the synergy payoff should be considered fair. Finally, we validated our findings by simulating the models. If we can use blockchain technology to enhance the mutual trust between enterprises and banks, both banks and enterprises can achieve sustainable development.