The impact of bicameralism on the disproportionality of cabinet portfolio allocation

Abstract

This study examines whether bicameralism affects cabinet composition in parliamentary democracy. While previous studies have examined the effect of bicameralism on the legislative process and cabinet duration, little is known about its effect on cabinet post allocation. Therefore, this study examines how and why the institutional and partisan strengths of upper chambers affect the outcome of coalition bargaining and post allocation. Theoretically, I argue that partisan strength in upper chambers enhances a party’s bargaining position, resulting in disproportionality between the party seat and cabinet portfolio share of the lower chamber in coalition gov ernments. The empirical results indicate that the level of disproportional ity in cabinet portfolio allocation is higher in countries with strong upper chambers than in countries with weak or no upper chambers. I also investi gate party level data in countries with strong upper chambers. After control ling for the party share of lower chambers in these countries, the advantage accrued by the upper chamber in terms of party seat share is likely to result in obtaining a higher share of cabinet portfolios.