Abstract
Measuring the effect of ballot access restrictions on electoral competition is complicated because the stringency of ballot access regulations cannot be treated as being exogenous to candidates' entry decisions. This paper exploits the 1968 U.S. Supreme Court decision to struck down Ohio's ballot access laws as a natural experiment to overcome the endogeneity problem. The evidence from difference-in-difference estimations suggests that the court decision and the accompanying sharp decrease in Ohio's petition requirements resulted in major parties facing a significant increase in competition from third party and independent candidates.
Highlights
The idea that competition is a salient prerequisite for the efficient functioning of markets is one of the central insights of economics
Our work builds on recent contributions by Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2004) and Trebbi, Aghion, and Alesina (2007) which challenge the traditional view that political institutions like ballot access rules can be treated as being exogenously given
By means of differencein-difference estimations, we identify the impact of the exogenous variation in the stringency of entry barriers for third party and independent candidates induced by the Supreme Court decision of 1968
Summary
The idea that competition is a salient prerequisite for the efficient functioning of markets is one of the central insights of economics. Minor parties and independent candidates, commonly need to file a petition signed by a certain number of eligible voters These petition requirements can potentially be designed by the (major) parties in power in a way that serves their interests and deters competition from minor political parties and independent candidates.. These petition requirements can potentially be designed by the (major) parties in power in a way that serves their interests and deters competition from minor political parties and independent candidates.3 To put it practically, suppose that in some states major parties are only challenged by weak competitors, making it unnecessary to set strict regulations to prevent the entry of those competitors. Our work builds on recent contributions by Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2004) and Trebbi, Aghion, and Alesina (2007) which challenge the traditional view that political institutions like ballot access rules can be treated as being exogenously given
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