Abstract

In reference to the American arms pipeline to the Jewish State during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, President Anwar Sadat reportedly said that Egypt could not simultaneously fight both Israel and the United States. He no doubt uttered these words primarily to pave the way for Egypt to accept a ceasefire with the Jewish State before the complete collapse of the Egyptian army as a result of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) counterattack across the Suez Canal. While Sadat’s statement cannot be taken as a serious reflection on the military situation during the Yom Kippur War—the US, after all, had not entered the war on Israel’s behalf and was simply matching Soviet military assistance to Egypt and Syria—it does, nevertheless, prompt a number of intriguing questions. To what extent did American arms transfers assist the Jewish State’s war effort? Did the arms pipeline contribute to Israel’s victory over the Syrian army on the Golan front? Did arms transfers contribute to the Jewish State’s triumph over the Egyptian army on the Sinai front? Or was the arms pipeline of more political and psychological than military value to Israel during the Yom Kippur War?

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