Abstract

AbstractSoon after their victory over the Spartans at the Battle of Leuctra in 371 BCE, the Thebans asserted their claim to Panhellenic leadership, but that hegemonic experiment turned out to be a brief affair in classical Greek history. It is the purpose of this paper to explain this failure by comparing the Theban approach to interstate relations with that of the earlier and more successful Athenian and Spartan models. The first section reexamines those hegemonic precedents and their supporting alliances (συμμαχίαι) which served both military and social functions. The next section looks closely at the attempt of the Thebans, under the leadership of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, to extend their own political and military power through the construction of seven alliances or groups of alliances from 370 to 364 BCE. Although the Thebans’ alliance treaties were designed according to conventional principles and provisions, their alliance network proved incapable of sustaining their Panhellenic aspirations. The final section seeks out answers to why the Thebans failed where others had previously succeeded. Whereas modern scholarship points to institutional and structural deficiencies or personal hatreds, this paper adds a further reason: that the Thebans neglected to cultivate interpersonal ties with their new allies that could transcend the temporary objectives and inspire the parties to continue their relationship in the long term. Consequently, the alliances, and thus the whole Theban hegemonic experiment, collapsed within only a short time of their inception.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call