The Imagination in Kant and Fichte

Abstract

Traditionally, imagination has been dismissed or devalued by philosophy. For centuries, it was considered a minor and secondary function in the constitution of our worldview. And this holds true for both its reproductive and productive aspects. In this paper, it will be argued that the view of the imagination changed radically after Kant, because he considered imagination not only a fundamental active faculty in the process of knowledge but also an authentic creative force, present both in aesthetic experience and in artistic production. With this he prepared the way for Fichte, Schelling and the Romantics, transforming it into an inventive activity, linked to genius and freedom, but at the same time, builder of our reality. Fichte is completely faithful to Kant’s theory of transcendental imagination, but, as it will be argued, he presents it from a different conception of philosophy, which will allow him to expand, deepen, and make it the basic faculty of man. Fichte took his principle, the last explanatory ground of the system, from the second Critique, from the Kantian idea that the key to the whole edifice of reason lies in practical reason. And so his starting point was the Thathandlung, the absolute action, without further conditions. This would give rise to a holistic vision, where the unity underlies the different human faculties, in a globalizing process led by the imagination, which creates new spheres of freedom, constructing all human activity, whether theoretical, practical, aesthetic or political.