The IFOR/SFOR Experience: Lessons Learned by PFP Partners

Abstract

Conclusions Among the Partnership for Peace states that participated in the Implementation and Stabilization Forces in the Balkins, the experiences of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Romania provide a rich summary of the collective lessons learned through these operations. Each of these four states: * experienced strains and distortions in their defense budgets * found it difficult to stand up their battalions and concluded that it would be necessary to establish pre-standing units for future peace support operations * learned that military officers' language training needed to be improved * determined that communications equipment and training needed to be changed saw IFOR/SFOR as a laboratory for deepening interoperability with NATO. JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD Once the Dayton Accords were signed, NATO broadened the terms of reference for Partnership for Peace (PFP) in December 1995 to include Opeace enforcement operations,' invited Partners to contribute forces to the Implementation Force (IFOR), and initiated operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. IFOR's primary mission was to maintain cessation of hostilities, move Serbs and Croats into separate zones, and to provide support for civilian implementation of the Accords. Recognizing that maintaining a reduced military presence would be necessary to stabilize the peace after IFOR's mandate, NATO initiated operation JOINT GUARD in December 1996 and set up the Stabilization Force (SFOR) with the same rules of engagement, reduced force structure, and with a mandate until June 1998. Thirteen of the 27 PFP Partners participated in the IFOR/SFOR operations. Of the Partners, Hungary's role was the most complex. Not only did it contribute troops as did Poland, the Czech Republic, and Romania; but Hungary permitted the temporary stationing of foreign troops in Hungary, provided transit support of foreign troops, and permitted their temporary stationing on Hungarian soil, as well as host nation support for IFOR/SFOR troops in Bosnia. Hungary Hungarian participation in IFOR/SFOR was challenging because its role and missions proved to be different from what Hungary had focused on in PFP exercises. It also represented the first time that the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) General Staff moved from a planning staff to an active participant in a NATO operation. Hungary's participation in IFOR/SFOR involved the following three roles and missions: (1) Troop contributions. After a Parliamentary Resolution, Hungary deployed a non-combat Engineering Battalion of 416 troops to IFOR in Croatia in late January 1996 under the operational control of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), and since November 1996 under LANDCENT. During SFOR, the Engineering Battalion has been reduced to 310 troops. The Engineering Battalion established its base in Croatia with an area of operations that covered all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it accomplished about 110 different tasks. These included building and restoring 19 bridges, rebuilding 20 kms of road, 65 kms of railroad line with five tunnels, and defusing land mines. Initial problems arose when Hungary started to organize and train the unit. Because the battalion was not a standing unit and conscripts are prohibited from being deployed abroad, Hungary had to start from scratch. When the Bosnian mandate was extended and Hungary committed to a continued, but reduced presence, more than two-thirds of its troops had already served for one year. When fresh troops were needed for Bosnia, Hungary had to rotate its troops and found this difficult. (2) Support the transit of foreign troops and temporarily station some troops in Hungary. Twelve nations (including the United States and Russia) have deployed and redeployed contingents to and from Bosnia through Hungary. By the spring of 1997, about 130,000 people, 13,000 aircraft, 1,100 railway convoys, and 65,000 wheeled vehicles had traversed Hungary. …