Abstract

This article uses data from the 1993–2011 national legislative elections in Russia in order to systematically measure and explain the dynamics of party system nationalization. The analysis registers a salient discrepancy between the extremely low levels of territorial homogeneity of the vote in the single-member plurality section of Russia's electoral system (1993–2003), on the one hand, and very high levels of party nationalization in party-list contests, on the other. This discrepancy, facilitated by such factors as the legacies of regime transition, federalism, and presidentialism, was reinforced by the integration of gubernatorial political machines into the nationwide political order, which ultimately resulted in unprecedentedly high levels of party nationalization in the 2007–2011 elections. The findings challenge a conventional theory that equates the formation of national electorates to the progressive process of party system consolidation, suggesting that under certain conditions, related but not reducible to the authoritarian perversion of the structure of electoral incentives, there is no such linear relationship.

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