The IDF Raid On Samu': The Turning-Point In Jordan's Relations With Israel and the West Bank Palestinians

Abstract

BETWEEN 1949 AND 1967 TWO issues dominated Israel's relations with its Arab neighbor to the east, Jordan: security along the border and the fate of the West Bank in case of a radical change in the Jordanian regime. Throughout these years, a complex relationship developed between the two states based on their common interest in safeguarding the integrity of the Royal Hashemite House of Jordan. Israel regarded Jordan as an ally in the handling of daily security issues and as a potential partner in a lasting peace agreement. Israel further believed that Jordan's independence and territorial integrity under King Hussein were strategic assets, and let it be known that any change in the Hashemite regime by military take-over, foreign subversion (Egyptian-Syrian), or the introduction of Iraqi army units would be seen as a major security threat to Israel and, therefore, justification for Israeli occupation of all or parts of the West Bank. At the same time, Israel held the Jordanian government responsible for maintaining a peaceful border and preventing any form of infiltration or sabotage. Although the Israelis were keenly aware of Hussein's serious efforts to stanch guerrilla attacks, Jerusalem persisted in punitive-retaliatory acts that sometimes had a jarring effect on the Jordanian regime. Hussein inherited from his grandfather, King Abdullah, a special relationship with Israel characterized by dialogue for dealing with routine security matters, the exchange of intelligence data, either directly or through third parties, and the mutual pursuit of a political solution. In contrast to other Arab leaders, Hussein harbored no offensive designs against Israel and, like his grandfather, preferred to settle the Palestinian problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict by peaceful means through the recognition of