The Ideological Valences of Twentieth-Century Historicism

Abstract

It was only after 1920, when productive season of contemporary historicism had drawn to a close, that problem of determining distinctive features of historicism and of explicitly stating what historicism is began to be considered. And in answers given to this problem by its most important representatives, historicism presented itself as a general philosophical conception, as a Weltanschauung which radically transforms consideration of history and penetrates all fields of life. Authors like Troeltsch and Meinecke, Mannheim and Croce agree that historicism is not only a theory of historical knowledge, a methodology of socio-historical sciences, but marks as well a decisive turning point in understanding of reality in fact, specifically modern conception of world, result of a centuries-old historical process. In a text dated 1910-1911, Dilthey already stated that the historical awareness of finitude of all historical phenomena, of every human or social situation, consciousness of relativity of every sort of belief is final step towards liberation of man;' it also shows in historical conscience condition of overcoming anarchy of philosophical systems. Some ten years later, following World War and trauma of German defeat, Ernst Troeltsch characterized crisis of historicism as being crisis of general philosophical presuppositions of historical thought, and therefore not as a crisis of historical knowledge but of its significance for conception of world. For Troeltsch, too, historicization of knowledge represented conclusion of development of modern thought; and so termination of historicism in a relativistic skepsis appears to be in Der Historismus und seine Probleme (1922) sign of a crisis involving fundamental presuppositions of modern culture. In similar terms, but in a decidedly positive